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RECENT DECISIONS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-JUDICIAL CONTROL-VETERANS ADMINISTRATION'S 
FINDINGS OF LAW AND FACT ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE IN GOVERNMENT'S SUIT TO 
RECOVER SuMs'ALLEGEDLY DuE FROM VETERAN-An action was brought by 
the United States to recover sums of money paid to a veteran as an employ-
ment readjustment allowance. It was claimed that the defendant was not 
entitled to the money because of his misstatement of earnings. Prior to this 
action, an administrative finding that the defendant had knowingly re-
ceived the allowance contrary to law and was obliged to retun1 it was 
approved by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs. The government main-
tained that section 705 of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act required 
that the administrator's findings of law and fact be conclusive and bind-
ing on the court. The federal district court, held, complaint dismissed with 
prejudice. It was not the congressional intent that the administrator's find-
ings should have retroactive finality when the government is seeking the 
recovery of pecuniary benefits already received by the veteran. United 
States v. Owens, (E.D. Ark. 1957) 147 F. Supp. 309. 
The statutory language of section 705 of the Servicemen's Readjustment 
Act is sweeping and unequivocal.1 In general, it prohibits the judicial 
review of findings of law and fact made by the Administrator of Veterans' 
Affairs.2 While constitutionality of this section has been upheld by those 
courts that have had occasion to consider it,3 in each case the petitioner 
was a veteran seeking judicial review of an administrative decision deny-
ing him right to future benefits. It is well recognized that since Congress 
may place conditions upon federal gratuities such as veterans' benefits, it 
may also place in an administrative agency the ultimate power to deter-
mine the validity of claims for such benefits.4 The courts have almost 
uniformly respected the administrator's findings under these circumstances.5 
148 Stat. 9 (1933), 38 U.S.C. (1952) §705: "All decisions rendered by the Administra• 
tor of Veterans' Affairs ••• shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law and 
fact, and no other official or court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to review 
by mandamus or otherwise any such decision." In that part of the legislation concerned 
with the duties, powers and functions of the Veterans Administration an almost identical 
provision appears. 54 Stat. 1197 (1940), 38 U.S.C. (1952) §lla-2. 
2 This type of provision is occasionally found in federal legislation creating admin-
istrative agencies with quasi-judicial functions. The language of the statute may vary from 
"final,'' "final and conclusive" to the language used in §705, which seems unmistakably 
to withdraw the jurisdiction of ti:::? courts. For similar federal statutes, and the judicial 
reaction to them, see DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§238, 239 (1951). 
s Barnett v. Hines, (D.C. Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 96, cert. den. 308 U.S. 573 (1939); 
Commers v. United States, (9th Cir. 1947) 159 F. (2d) 248, cert. den. 331 U.S. 807 (1947). 
4 Smith v. United States, (8th Cir. 1936) 83 F. (2d) 631; Barnett v. Hines, note 3 
supra; Commers v. United States, note 3 supra. 
5 United States ex rel. Farmer v. Thompson, (4th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 947; Hahn 
v. Gray, Jr., (D.C. Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 625; Snauffer v. Stimson, (D.C. Cir. 1946) 155 F. 
(2d) 861. But cf. Siegel v. United States, (E.D. N.Y. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 555, where court 
held the findings were not reviewable but that it could order a rehearing by the ad-
ministrator. 
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A substantially different issue arises when the veteran has already received 
the benefits and the government seeks to recover them, asserting that the 
court is bound by the administrator's finding that the veteran now owes 
the government. A few courts, under these circumstances, have acknowl-
edged that they were obliged by section 705 not to review the findings, 
and therefore gave judgment for the government. 6 The court in the princi-
pal case, recognizing that such a result might raise a serious constitutional 
question,7 adopted a more liberal interpretation.8 Its ruling that the sec-
tion in question prohibited judicial review only when the prospective 
finality of the administrator's findings was challenged, and not when the 
government sought recovery of money, has judicial support.9 Similar pro• 
hibitions in other federal legislation have not prevented judicial review 
when the courts felt review was desirable.10 That the facts of this case 
merited such an interpretation of the statute cannot be doubted. To as-
sume that Congress intended that section 705 should enable the govern-
ment, by means of an informal hearing, to create for itself an invulnerable 
cause of action for the recovery of gratuities paid to a veteran is incon-
sistent with the beneficent purpose of the legislation establishing veterans' 
benefits.11 The dilemma posed by the unequivocal language of the statute 
on the one hand, and the congressional intent on the other, is amicably 
resolved in favor of the latter when it appears that only slight inconven-
ience results to the government from such an interpretation. By producing 
proper evidence in court, the government can recover the sums paid with-
out a possible deprivation of the individual's constitutional rights. 
James M. Porter, S. Ed. 
6 United States v. Perry, (E.D. N.C. 1956) 141 F. Supp. 443; United States v. Gude-
wicz, (E.D. N.Y. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 787; In re Rosa's Estate, 16 N.Y.S. (2d) 285, 172 Misc. 
808 (1939). 
7 At p. 314, the court quoted the opinion in Hormel v. United States, (S.D. N.Y. 
1954) 123 F. Supp. 806 at 810: "• ..• the Government's construction ... raises the 
serious question whether the ,Fifth Amendment would not invalidate a law which would 
permit the Government to recover a judgment against a citizen without giving him an 
opportunity to challenge the bare assertion of an administrative officer that money 
was due and owing .•• .' " 
s ·when the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the federal courts will first 
determine "whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question 
may be avoided.'' Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 at 62 (1932). American Communications 
Assn., CIO, v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1949), rehearing den. 339 U.S. 990 (1950). See also, 
comment, 53 CoL. L. REv. 633 (1953). 
9 Hormel v. United States, note 7 supra. See also United States v. Gibson, (9th Cir. 
1953) 207 F. (2d) 161. 
10 Whether the courts will review findings of federal agencies in the face of a statute 
that seems to preclude review is not necessarily determined by the literal language em-
ployed in the statute, but will depend on the facts of each case. For a discussion of the 
Supreme Court's position in this area, see Davis, "Unreviewable Administrative Action," 
15 F.R.D. 411 at 433-446 (1954). See also Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law: 
1942-1951," 51 MICH. L. REV. 775 at 840-844 (1953). 
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